Figuring out the impact of hidden savings on optimal unemployment insuranc by Narayana Kocherlakota
Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 541–554
www.elsevier.com/locate/red




Stanford University, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, and NBER, USA
Received 7 August 2002; revised 11 October 2003
Available online 25 May 2004
Abstract
In this paper, I consider the problem of optimal unemployment insurance in a world in which
the unemployed agent’s job-ﬁnding effort is unobservable and his level of savings is unobservable.
I show that the ﬁrst-order approach is not always valid for this problem, and I argue that the available
recursive procedures are not currently computationally feasible. Nonetheless, for the case in which
the disutility of effort is linear, I am able to provide a complete characterization of the optimal
contract: the agent’s consumption is constant while he is unemployed, and jumps up to a higher
constant and history-independent level of consumption when he ﬁnds a job.
 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In a recent paper, Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) study the properties of an optimal
insurance arrangement between a risk-neutral insurer (principal) and a risk-averse worker
(agent). They assume that the agent begins life unemployed and expends a hidden amount
of effort to ﬁnd a job in each period. His probability of ﬁnding a job is increasing in the
amount of effort exerted; once he ﬁnds a job, he keeps it forever. Importantly, the insurer
has complete control over the agent’s consumption, because the agent cannot secretly
transfer consumption from one period to the next.
They ﬁnd that in an optimal contract between the principal and the agent, the agent’s
consumption is a decreasing function of his time spent unemployed. This general result
✩ This paper previously circulated under the title “Simplifying optimal unemployment insurance: The role of
hidden savings.”
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has two consequences. First, an agent who has been unemployed for t periods has a lower
consumptionthanan agentwho has beenunemployedfor (t −1) periods.Second,an agent
who ﬁnds a job after a long period of unemployment must make a higher payment to the
insurer than an agent who ﬁnds a job after a short period of unemployment.
As stated above, Hopenhayn and Nicolini assume that the principal can costlessly
monitor the agent’s savings and condition contractual payments on this variable. One can
showthattheoptimalcontractin HopenhaynandNicolini’ssettinghasthepropertythatthe
agent is savings-constrained when unemployed: the agent’s shadow interest rate is lower
than the principal’s shadow interest rate. Nor is this feature of the Hopenhayn–Nicolini
contract unique to the unemployment insurance problem. Rogerson (1985a) shows that in
settings with repeated moral hazard, it is generally optimal to impose a sufﬁciently severe
punishmentfor poor output performance that the agent ends up being savings-constrained.
Intuitively, the agent would like to save so as to mitigate next period’s punishment.1
It follows that with moral hazard, the optimal dynamic contract is only incentive-
compatible under the assumption that the principalis able to costlessly monitor the agent’s
asset levels. This assumption is somewhat restrictive. After all, there are a number of
ways that a person can transfer resources to the future (like foreign bank accounts or by
accumulating durables) that may be hard for outsiders to observe. It is therefore important
to understand the intertemporalstructure of optimal contracts when the agent is allowed to
engage in secret asset accumulation.
This paper is a contribution to this general research agenda. I relax the assumption
that savings can be monitored by the principal in the Hopenhayn–Nicoliniunemployment
insurance model, and assume instead that the agent can secretly save at the same rate as
the principal. I then look to solve for the optimal insurance contract.2 Not surprisingly,
this problem is generally impossible to solve analytically. Unfortunately, it is also difﬁcult
to solve numerically. In a recent paper, Fernandes and Phelan (2000) have described a
recursive formulation for a related class of problems. It is not known, though, how to
translate their recursiveformulationinto a practicalcomputationalprocedurewhensavings
can take on a continuumof values. Werning (2002)and Abrahamand Pavoni(2003)attack
the problem by using a computationally feasible ﬁrst-order approach that replaces the
agent’sincentiveconstraintswiththecorrespondingﬁrst orderconditions.However,I show
that even in simple examples, the ﬁrst-order approachmay not be valid because the agent’s
decision problem is intrinsically non-concave in effort and savings.
It is possible, though, to obtain an analytical solution in a particular case, even when
the ﬁrst-order approach is known to be invalid. I assume that the agent’s disutility from
effort is linear in the probability of his ﬁnding a job, and that the principal wants the
agent to exert an interior amount of effort while unemployed. Under these assumptions,
1 In a recent working paper, Shimer and Werning (2003) consider unemployment insurance in a version of
the McCall search paradigm. They assume that the insurer cannot observe the wage drawn by the unemployed
agent. They show that if the agent has exponential utility, then the optimal unemployment insurance contract is
the same whether or not the agent can secretly save and/or borrow.
2 Isearch across all incentive-compatible insurance contracts. Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2002) instead consider an
incomplete markets economy with a limited set of possible unemployment insurance systems. They numerically
characterize the optimal unemployment insurance system in that set.N.R. Kocherlakota / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 541–554 543
I provethat the optimalunemploymentinsurance contract takes an extremely simple form.
During the period that an agent is unemployed, his consumption is constant. When he
becomes employed, his consumption jumps up to a new constant level that is independent
of the duration of the unemployment spell. This structure implies that once the agent’s
savings level is unobservable,it is optimalfor the agentto be borrowing-constrained when
unemployed.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. The contract has to be designed to punish
the agent as severely as possible, given that it must deter the agent from saving. This
intuitionwouldseem toleadtotheoptimalcontract’sfeaturingconsumption-smoothing,so
thatthe principalandagenthavethesame shadowinterestrate.3 However,the veryfactthat
theﬁrst-orderapproachfailsisasignthat thisintuitionis wrong.Thebindingintertemporal
incentive constraint is one in which the agent jointly deviates from the optimal contract by
simultaneouslysavingmoreandworkingless. Whenthecontractisdesignedtopreventthis
joint deviation, the agent ends up being borrowing-constrainedgiven that he does work the
amount speciﬁed by the contract.
In this paper, I assume that the unemployed agent cannot borrow secretly. I have two
reasons for this restriction. The ﬁrst is technical: in the linear disutility case, there are no
incentive-compatible contracts (including repetition of any static contract) if agents can
engage in both hidden borrowing and lending. The second is more substantive. It is much
more difﬁcult for individuals to engage in hidden borrowing than hidden saving, because
their loans have to be enforced. In contrast, as Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) explicitly
model, hidden saving can take the form of physical investment. Physical investment
requires no outside enforcement and so is intrinsically more difﬁcult to monitor.
2. The problem
Inthis section,I describea variantof the Hopenhayn–Nicoliniunemploymentinsurance












where, in both utility functions, ct is the agent’s consumption in period t.T h ev a r i a b l ept
is the agent’s effort in period t, and lies in the set [0,1]. I assume that u ,−u  ,v  > 0,
v    0, and that u is bounded from above and from below. I assume that 0 <β<1.
3 This intuition is valid in the environment with hidden income and hidden storage studied by Cole and
Kocherlakota (2001). The key difference between the two settings is that in Cole and Kocherlakota, the two types
of deviations (storing from period t to period (t +1) and then lying) are not complementary in utility. In contrast,
shirking and storing are complementary in the model studied in this paper.544 N.R. Kocherlakota / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 541–554
An agent can be employed or unemployed; he begins life unemployed. The choice of
pt affects the probability of becoming employed for an unemployed agent. Speciﬁcally, if
an agent is unemployed at the end of period (t − 1), then the probability of his becoming
employed in period t is pt, and the probability of his staying unemployed is (1 − pt).
If an agent is employed at the end of period (t − 1), he stays employed in period t with
probability one. Thus, being employed is an absorbing state.
The agent’s employment status is observable to others, but his choice of pt is
unobservable. As well, the agent can secretly save at rate 1/β − 1. I consider contracts
in this economy that specify two sequences {cE
t ,cU
t }∞
t=1. Given such a contract, an agent
who is unemployed in period t receives compensation cU
t from the principal. If an agent
became employed for the ﬁrst time in period t, then his compensation from the principal
in period s  t is cE
t . Thus, once an agent is employed, his compensation is constant over
time. (It is simple to show that because the principal and agent have the same discount
factor, this smooth compensation is efﬁcient in this economy.)
I assume that the principal wants to (weakly) implement a sequence of effort choices
p∗ ={ p∗
t }∞
t=1 by the agent when unemployed, where 1 >p ∗
t > 0f o ra l lt.Id e ﬁ n ea n





























t +St−1(1−β)/β for all t,
ζU
t = cU
t +St−1/β −St for all t,
St,pt,1−pt,ζE
t ,ζU
t 0f o r a l l t,
S0 = 0,
so that it is weakly optimal for an unemployed agent to choose p∗
t in all t. Note that if
an agent becomes employed in period t with savings St−1, then his optimally smoothed
consumption is (cE
t +St−1(1−β)/β)in every period thereafter.4
It is straightforward to show that, given any incentive-compatible contract, there exists
a payoff-equivalent contract (cE ,cU ) in which the agent’s optimal savings sequence is
4 I do not formally model why the principal desires to implement an interior p∗. It is standard in principal-
agent problems to model the principal’s objective as being linear in p; this assumption, if the agent’s utility
function is linear in p, would generically result in the principal’s preferring a bang-bang speciﬁcation for p.
However, in this unemployment insurance problem, the principal may prefer an interior choice for p because
of search externalities. Suppose that the principal is contracting with a unit measure of agents, and that a given
agent’s disutility from choosing a probability p is given by pΨ(p),w h e r ep is the average p chosen by the other
agents in the economy. If Ψ is increasing, then there are congestion effects—it becomes harder for a given agent
to ﬁnd a job when other agents are searching a lot. When designing the optimal contract, the principal internalizes
the externality implicit in Ψ, and the principal’s choice of p will, for a generic class of problems, be interior.N.R. Kocherlakota / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 541–554 545
zero. I restrict attention to these contracts that induce zero savings, and look to solve the



































































t  0f o r a l l t.
In words: What contracts are the minimal-cost incentive-compatible contracts among all
those that provide the agent with ex-ante utility of at least u∗?
3. Difﬁculties
In this section, I consider two recently developed approaches to solving UIP.T h eﬁ r s t
is to make the problem recursive in some fashion. I ﬁnd that this approach is, at least of
this writing, computationally infeasible. The second is to use a version of the ﬁrst-order
approach. I ﬁnd that this approach will not work if the curvature of v is sufﬁciently small.
3.1. Can we make the problem recursive?
Much of the recent analysis of dynamicmoral hazard problemsis based on an insight of
Spear and Srivastava (1987). They show that, without hidden savings or other hidden state
variables, dynamic moral hazard problems are recursive in the following sense: in each
period, the principal chooses current consumption and next period’s continuation utility
so as to minimize his costs subject to the incentive constraints, and subject to delivering a
speciﬁed amount of continuationutility to the agent. Hence, the principal-agentproblemis
recursive with respect to a one-dimensional state variable: continuation utility.
The difﬁculty in making UIP recursive in a similar fashion is that if an agent brings
savings into the period, his response to any given contract is different than if he does
not bring savings. In other words, the presence of hidden savings essentially introduces
an adverse selection problem at each date. Fernandes and Phelan (2000) show how to deal
with this kind of dynamicadverse selection problem:the principalmust minimize his costs
subject to delivering a given amount of continuation utility to every type.546 N.R. Kocherlakota / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 541–554
Here’s how Fernandes and Phelan’s insight works in this context. Suppose the principal
wants to induce an unemployed agent to choose p∗ in every period. Given an incentive-
compatible contract (cE,cU), we can deﬁne V(S)/(1 − β) to be the ex-ante utility of the
agent if he begins life with S units of savings (as opposed to with zero) and then chooses
an optimal effort and savings strategy in response to the contract. Thus, V is a value
function.D e ﬁ n eDOM to be the set of all such value functions (as we vary the incentive-
compatible contract (cE,cU)). Further, given a value function V in DOM,l e tΠ(V)be the
minimal cost to the principal of all incentive-compatible contracts that generate the value
function V.









































cE,cU  0,W∈ DOM.
At a given point in time, the principal seeks to minimize the expected value of his
discounted costs, given that he wishes to induce an agent with no assets to choose effort
p∗ and to choose not to save. The possibility of hidden savings means that, in order to
make sure the contract is in fact incentive-compatible,the agent needs to know how much
utility he will get from choosingvalues of savings other than the principal’spreferred level
of savings (zero). Hence, the principal needs to satisfy a promise-keeping constraint that
appliesto all valuesof S, notjust S = 0, andneedsto picka continuationvaluefunctionW,
not just a continuation utility.
We now have a recursive approach to UIP.L e tΠ be the solution to (FE). Then, the





He obtains a solution V0 to this minimization problem. Next, the principal solves the
minimizationproblemin (FE) with V0 substituted in for V, and obtainsa solution (cE
1 ,cU
1 )
and a continuation value function V1. He again solves the minimization problem in (FE),
now with V1 substituted in for V. This will deliver a (cE
2 ,cU
2 ), as well a continuation value





Note that because of hidden savings, the relevant state variable is now a function, not a
number as when only effort is hidden. This is inevitable, because we have to keep track ofN.R. Kocherlakota / Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (2004) 541–554 547
continuation utility for all types—that is, for all savings levels. As well, we have to use a
generalization of Abreu et al. (1990) to iterate on (inﬁnite-dimensional) sets of functions
until we ﬁnd DOM. These inﬁnities pose signiﬁcant computational difﬁculties. Hence, at
this point in time, it is not known how to implement Fernandes and Phelan’s recursive
approach in practice when the agent has a continuum of possible savings levels.5
3.2. The ﬁrst-order approach
Much of the analysis of moral hazard problems uses the ﬁrst-order approach.T os e e
how this approach works, it’s useful to look at a two-period version of the unemployment
insurance problem posed in the previous section. I set the discount rate equal to zero, and
assume that the agent has preferences of the form
ln(c1)+ln(c2) −v(p2)
and a technology of the form
y =
	
E with probability p2,
U with probability 1−p2.
Theagentcansecretlysaveat a zerorateofreturn.Theprincipalcannotobservethe agent’s
choice of storage level or the agent’s choice of p2; the principal can condition the agent’s
second period consumption on the realization of y.
The principal’s problem is to (weakly) implement a choice p∗
2 ∈ (0,1) at minimal ex-
pectedcost,giventhattheagentmustreceiveat leastreservationutilityu∗.Mathematically,































It is simple to show that givena solution to this problem (c1,cE,cU),t h e n(c1−S,cE +S,
cU +S)is also a solutionwhich leadsthe agent notto store. Hence,the principal’sminimal































5 However, if the agent had only a ﬁnite number of possible savings levels, we might be able to use this
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I call this problem P1.
A difﬁculty with this problem is that there is no obvious way to attack it using standard
Lagrangian methods. The ﬁrst-order approach gets around this difﬁculty by replacing



































This problem has two advantages relative to P1. The ﬁrst is obvious: the constraint
set is such that the problem is easily amenable to Lagrangian methods. The second
advantageis more subtle. In the previoussubsection, we saw that the recursive formulation
of P1 is difﬁcult to implement computationally. Werning (2002) considers multiperiod
versions of the problem P2. He shows that, in each period, the principal chooses current
consumption and next period’s continuation utility subject to the incentive constraints
on effort, subject to delivering a pre-speciﬁed amount of continuation utility and subject
to not exceeding a pre-speciﬁed upper bound on marginal utility of consumption. The
last constraint guarantees that the principal is satisfying the agent’s intertemporal Euler
equation at each point in time. Thus, multiperiod versions of P2 are recursive in two state
variables: continuation utility and an upper bound on continuation marginal utility. This
is much simpler than multi-period versions of P1 (like our original problem UIP),w h e r e
we have to keep track of an inﬁnite-dimensional state variable (and solve as well for the
domain of that state variable).
So, it seems like a good idea to attack P2 instead of P1. Unfortunately, solving P2
may not be the same as solving P1. The problem is that the agent’s objective function is
not globally concave in savings and effort. It follows that the ﬁrst order conditions of the
agent’s decision problem are only necessary: the constraint set to P2 is in general larger
than the constraint set to P1. This creates the possibility that the solution to P2 may notbe
incentive-compatible.I now show that this possibility is in fact realized if v has sufﬁciently
low curvature.
To do so, I ﬁrst solve P2. In this two-period context, the solution is simple: at an
optimum, the two weak inequalities must hold with equality. If the last constraint is an
inequality, simply lower c1: this lowers the principal’s objective without violating the
other two constraints. If the second constraint is an inequality, raise c1 by εc1,l o w e r
cE by εcE and lower cU by εcU. This keeps the agent’s ex-ante utility the same, and
does not affect the agent’s effort decision. The principal’s objective is lowered because
c1 <p ∗
2cE +(1−p∗
2)cU (by Jensen’s inequality).
Thus, the solution to P2 is the unique triple (c∗
1,c∗
E,c∗
U) that satisﬁes all constraints
with equality. However, (c∗
1,c∗
E,c∗




U), the agent’s objective is supposedly maximized at S = 0a n dp2 = p∗
2.B y
construction, the agent’s ﬁrst order conditions are satisﬁed (with equality). But look at the

































A necessary condition for S = 0a n dp2 = p∗
2 to solve the agent’s problem is that this
Hessian be negative semi-deﬁnite. It is true that the diagonal elements are non-positive.
But the determinant of the Hessian is negative if v  (p∗
2) is sufﬁciently small, and so,
even though the agent’s ﬁrst order conditions are satisﬁed at S = 0a n dp2 = p∗
2, he can
experience a second-order gain by increasing S above 0 and lowering p2 below p∗
2.
Thus,evenin thissimple example,the ﬁrst-orderapproachis invalidif v hassufﬁciently
low curvature. This possibility is generated by the fact that the agent’s objective function
is not guaranteedto be non-concaveas a function of p2 and S. The same kind of reasoning
can be applied in the inﬁnite-horizon setting of Section 2 to show that we cannot always
use the ﬁrst-order approach.6
There is no set of known conditions in the inﬁnite horizon problem UIP that are
sufﬁcient to guarantee that the ﬁrst-order approach is valid with hidden savings. Abraham
and Pavoni (2003) point out, though, that it is possible to verify whether a particular
solution to the ﬁrst-orderapproachproblemis actually a solution to the true problem.They
use a two-step numerical procedure in their analysis of optimal unemployment insurance
with hidden borrowing and lending. First, they solve the ﬁrst-order approach problem
(the inﬁnite-horizon analog of P2). Second, they verify whether the solution is incentive-
compatible, by checking whether the agent ﬁnds it optimal to choose p∗ when confronted
withthesolutioncontract.Theyconcludethatforalloftheirparameterizations,thesolution
to the ﬁrst-order approach problem is in fact the solution to the true problem.
Werning (2002) also attacks UIP by solving the ﬁrst-order approachproblem.For some
speciﬁcations of u and v, he shows numerically and analytically that in the solution to this
problem, the difference between cUt and cEt is falling over time. (He interprets this falling
differentialas implyingthat unemploymentbeneﬁtsshould be increasingin the durationof
unemployment.)His paper does not have the kind of explicit veriﬁcation step contained in
Abraham and Pavoni (2003). Hence, his paper contains no information about whether his
characterization of the solution to the ﬁrst-order approach problem carries over to the true
problem UIP or not.
4. Solving the insurance problem in the linear disutility case
We now return to the problem UIP: what is the principal’s preferred contract among all
those incentive-compatiblecontracts that providethe agent with ex-anteutility no less than
u∗? We have seen in the previous section that there are no generally valid approaches that
6 Even without hidden savings, it is possible that the ﬁrst-order approach is invalid. The basic problem,
again, is that the agent’s problem may not be globally concave in effort. However, there are known sufﬁcient
conditions that preclude this possibility and P1 satisﬁes those sufﬁcient conditions. See Rogerson (1985b) for a
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are currently computationally feasible to solving contracting problems with hidden effort
and hidden savings. In this section, I specialize the problem by assuming that
v(p2) = αp2,α > 0.
Underthis assumption,the ﬁrst-orderapproachis deﬁnitelyinvalid,because the Hessian of
the agent’s objective is guaranteed not to be negative deﬁnite. Nonetheless, I can provide a
complete analytical characterization of the optimal contract.
4.1. A relaxed problem
We begin by ﬁrst constructing a superset for the set of incentive-compatible contracts.














−α(1−β) for all t. (R1)
This restriction derives from the linearity of the agent’s problem. In particular, in
period t, the agent’s problem is linear in pt+s for s  0. Hence, if he chooses pt > 0
in every period, he must be indifferent among all possible p sequences, including setting
pt+s = 0f o ra l ls, and setting pt = 1.
The restriction (R1) is implied by efforts being hidden. In addition, hidden savings
implies that any incentive-compatiblecontract must also satisfy
cU
t  cU
t+1 for all t. (R2)
Suppose cU
t+1 <c U
t . Then, an unemployed agent in period t prefers to set (St > 0,
pt+1 = 0) to setting (St = 0,pt+1 = 0).B u t(R1) implies that the agent is indifferent
between setting (St = 0,pt+1 = 0) and (St = 0,pt+1 = p∗
t+1). Hence, if cU
t+1 <c U
t ,i ti s
not optimal for an unemployed agent in period t to set St = 0a n dpt+1 = p∗
t+1.T h i si sa
contradiction of incentive-compatibility.



















for all t, (R3)
andstill notbeincentive-compatible.(R1) and(R3) aretheﬁrst-ordernecessaryconditions
that are implied by the optimality of effort strategy p∗ and zero savings. But, just as in the
discussion of the ﬁrst-order approach in the previoussection, they do not take into account
the second-order consequences of simultaneous changes in savings and effort.
Thus, the set of contracts that satisfy (R1) and (R2) are a superset of the incentive-
compatible contracts. We now pose a relaxed problem: among the contracts that satisfy
(R1) and (R2), and provide the agent with at least u∗ in ex-ante utility, which ones does
the principal prefer?
4.2. Solving the relaxed problem
To solve the relaxed problem, we begin with two straightforward observations. First, in
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If it does not, we can lower u(cU
1 ) by ε and u(cE
1 ) by ε(1− β). This change improves the
principal’s objective without violating any of the constraints for ε small. Second, note that
the constraints (R1) and (R2) together imply that in any solution, cU
t <c E
t for all t.






t+1. Then,we canconstructa new contractby usinga perturbation
similar to that in Rogerson (1985a): raising u(cU
t ) by ε,l o w e r i n gu(cU
t+1) by εβ−1 and
lowering u(cE
t+1) by εβ−1(1− β). This new contract satisﬁes (R1) for any ε, and satisﬁes
(R2) as long as ε is sufﬁciently small. The new contract’s change in cost relative to the old
































and so the old contract was not optimal.
Hence, in any contract that solves the relaxed problem, cU
t = cU for all t.F r o m(R1),
we know that
cE






for all t. We can then ﬁnd the unique solution to the relaxed problem by substituting into





4.3. The optimal contract
We have characterized the unique solution to the relaxed problem. To verify that it in
fact solves the original problem, we need to show that this solution is in fact incentive-








Hence, no matter what p sequence that he chooses, an unemployed agent never wants to
save. As well, the agent is indifferent between all levels of p in each period. It follows that
the contract is indeed incentive-compatible, and must be in fact the principal’s preferred
incentive-compatiblecontract.
4.4. Discussion
It is useful to contrast this contract with the optimal contract when the agent cannot
secretly save. When savings are observable, it is optimal in this setting for the principal to
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Intuitively,the optimal way to provide incentives in period (t +1) is to punish the agent so
severely when he is unemployed that he would like to save from period t to period (t +1).
Once the agentcan save secretly, it is no longer possible to punish the agentso severely.
The key principle underlying the optimal contract is that it is designed to punish the agent
as much as is possible ex-post, given the agent’s ability to undermine such punishments
using secret savings. One might think that this principle means that the optimal contract
would adjust to secret savings by making the above inequality an equality. Indeed, had we
incorrectly used the ﬁrst-order approach to “solve” UIP, the “solution” would in fact have
had this property.
The problem with this thinking is that even if a contract satisﬁes the intertemporal
Euler equation u (cU
t ) = pt+1u (cE
t+1)+(1−pt+1)u (cU
t+1), the agent can still undermine
the punishment inherent in the contract by saving secretly. In particular, suppose the
intertemporal Euler equation holds but cU
t >c U
t+1. Then, the agent will ﬁnd it optimal
to save (cU
t − cU
t+1)/2 from period t to period (t + 1) a n dt h e ns e tpt+1 = 0i np e r i o d
(t + 1). In other words, the possibility of a joint deviation of saving and shirking imposes
the even tighter intertemporal restriction of cU
t  cU
t+1 on the optimal contract. Given this
restriction, the optimalcontractimposesthe mostsevere punishmenton the agentin period
(t +1)—and this implies that cU
t equals cU
t+1 in the optimal contract.
















are other optimal contracts which induce the same consumption allocation for the agent,
but a positive amount of private savings in at least some period. But it is optimal for the
agent to be borrowing-constrained at every date in the optimal contract; hence, private
savings must be zero at every date.
It is useful to note as well that the optimal contract in this setting is renegotiation-proof:
it is Paretooptimalat the beginningofeach period.(Of course,it is not Paretooptimal after
the agent has exerted effort within a period, but before the realization of his employment
status.) In contrast, Chiappori et al. (1994) ﬁnd that the ex-ante optimal contract is not
renegotiation-proof when they consider a principal-agent problem in which the agent has
only two possible effort choices and can secretly borrow and lend.
5. Conclusions
This paper considers the optimal provision of unemployment insurance for an agent
who can secretly exert effort to ﬁnd a job and who can secretly save. The paper argues
that it is not practical to compute an approximatesolution to the contractingproblem using
currently available recursive methods. As well, the ﬁrst-order approach is not generally
valid: the complementary nature of shirking and saving makes the agent’s problem non-
concave.
Despite these difﬁculties, it is possible to completely and analytically characterize the
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of ﬁnding a job. The paper uses this characterization to show that the nature of optimal
unemploymentinsurance is considerably changed if the agent can engage in secret saving.
In particular, the agent’s compensation when he is unemployed or when he gets a job is
independent of his history, instead of depending in complicated ways on the duration of
unemployment. As well, rather than being savings-constrained, the agent faces binding
borrowing constraints at each date.
It is natural to ask whether these ﬁndings are robust to introducing small amounts of
curvaturein v. I suspect that the exact history independenceresult will collapse—although
my guess is that even in those cases, there will not be much loss in welfare in restricting
the contract to be history independent. As well, I suspect too that the optimal contract will
continue to leave the agent borrowing-constrained (which also means that the ﬁrst-order
approach will not work). The challenge that remains is to develop robust and practical
numerical methods to assess these, and other, conjectures. The continuous-time approach
of Williams (2003) may be a promising step in this direction.
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